Posted: 27 March 2005 at 6:03am | IP Logged

The Story of the Battle of Sekigahara

Among the soldiers forming ranks at the battlefield of Sekigahara as dawn broke on the morning of October 21, 1600, there were few who could doubt that a decisive battle here would mark the end of decades of civil strife and that, at the end of the day, a new shogun with power throughout all Japan would emerge. It was just over two years since Toyotomi Hideyoshi, a man with the power and strength to unify Japan but without the breeding and authority to become shogun, had died. Since then, the most powerful daimyo in the land, men of noble birth and regents to the juvenile heir of Hideyoshi, had continued the feuding for absolute power. Factions among the five regents had formed so that, on this day, the two most powerful contenders for the shogunate, Tokugawa Ieyasu and Ishida Mitsunari faced each other for the final showdown.

Ishida was better renowned for his political rather than military skills. Nevertheless, his claim to support the interests of Hideyoshi's son, Hideyori, attracted many former allies of the old warlord to his side. His army of some 80,000 at Sekigahara included many famous warrior names of the recent past, such the Mori of Choshu, the Kobayakawa, the Kikkawa, the Ukita and the Shimazu of Satsuma. Since most of these families had their power-base in western Japan, Ishida's forces are generally referred to as the 'Army of the West'. Ieyasu, already the most powerful individual land-owner in Japan and with a distinguished military career behind him, was based in his comparatively new castle at Edo. Supported by his family - the Matsudaira - and some able generals such as Ii Naomasa (who had already fought alongside him on numerous campaigns), Ieyasu had also been successful in gaining the alliance of some notable daimyo families such as the Kato, the Hosokawa, and the Kuroda. Their strong power-base in eastern Japan meant, naturally, the Tokugawa forces are referred to as the 'Army of the East'. Their numbers at Sekigahara were some 74,000.

The campaign which culminated at Sekigahara had begun with political maneuverings some months earlier. In July, Tokugawa Ieyasu was drawn away from the Regent's Council at Osaka to defend his eastern domains from potential threat by a neighbor allied to the Ishida faction. Ishida promptly called his Western allies to arms to mount a surprise attack on Ieyasu from the rear. Ieyasu was not to be fooled, however, and his elaborate network of spies kept him informed of exactly what was going on. Having used his time to draw together his own allied forces, he set off from Edo in August to feign attack on his neighbor to the north. He then turned west with his main body of troops to thwart Ishida's intended line of campaign.

Moving swiftly with the element of surprise Ieyasu succeeded in blocking the highways to Edo by taking Gifu castle and nearby Konosu castle. Ishida meanwhile was at Ogaki castle, having been delayed earlier in a protracted siege for Fushimi castle - just south of Kyoto. News of Ieyasu's speed and progress shocked Ishida, and he was further confused by the misinformation spread by spies that Ieyasu's next intention was to by-pass Ogaki castle to attack Ishida's own stronghold at Sawayama, west of Sekigahara. Such a move, Ishida knew, would leave the path open for a march by the Tokugawa forces to Kyoto and Osaka, and to the young Hideyori. He decided on October 20th to retreat from Ogaki castle and defend the pass at Sekigahara to block any further westward movement by his enemy. This was exactly what Ieyasu wanted, for, despite inferior numbers, he excelled in open-field battle.

When dawn broke on the morning of the 21st the preoccupation of most soldiers was to dry their sodden clothes after a driving rain encountered during troop movements the night before. Nobody could see what was going on anyway, because a heavy mist limited visibility to just a few feet. The rival generals itched for battle, however, and at eight o'clock in the morning, as soon as the mist began to lift, the crackle of muskets sounded as the first charge thundered across the valley. The vanguard of the Tokugawa forces, led by Ii Naomasa and Fukushima Masanori, had taken the initiative and crashed into the center of the Western army's defensive line. A battle of attrition developed as, throughout the rest of the morning, more commanders ordered their men into the fray along the wavering battle front. The Eastern army made some ground on the northern flanks of the valley, where Ishida himself had set up his command post, but the southern end of the line was stoutly defended by the battle hardened troops of Otani, who held their position for the Westerners. If the Western line could continue to hold out the day would ultimately belong to Ishida - for his defense of Hideyori against the usurpers from the east would have succeeded.

The turning point in the battle came shortly after noon. Uncommitted to the fighting so far were the forces of the Kobayakawa family, Ishida allies who overlooked the bloody field from a position on the hill slope above the southern end of the line. Ishida had already sent frantic signals to his ally to relieve the pressure on Otani by attacking the Easterners from the rear. Ieyasu also kept a wary eye on events. If the Kobayakawa forces did make such a move his cause would probably be lost. His tenseness was tinged with fury against his own son, Hidetada, who had failed so far to arrive at the battle-field with his 38,000 troops. The ace-card had already been played by Ieyasu, however. Once again his spies had been in action, before the battle, to persuade Kobayakawa to change sides and betray the Western army. When Kobayakawa finally made his charge down the hill, prompted by a volley fired at him on Ieyasu's orders, it was against the brave Otani rather than the Eastern army that his men's bloodlust was directed. Otani still held out for a while longer, despite being heavily out-numbered. Other defections to the Eastern army eventually proved too much though, and Otani, now faced with defeat, performed his last action that day by ripping his stomach open in the ritual manner.

With the southern flank lost Ishida's army now realized victory was with the Easterners. Dropping their weapons most, including Ishida himself, fled to the northern hill slopes and the shelter of Mount Ibuki. Only Shimazu remained, fighting Ii Naomasa and his 'Red Devils' - and wounding Ii Naomasa with a musket ball through his arm. Eventually Shimazu too recognized defeat, and was persuaded to quit the field. With retreat to the north now cut off, however, his only option was to charge through the Tokugawa center and head for the Ise road. His boldness paid off. Exchanging helmets with his nephew to confuse the enemy, he led his remaining 200 troops right past the bemused Ieyasu, with Ii Naomasa's Red Devils in hot pursuit. Reaching the road his brave nephew, in disguise, turned to fight a rear-guard action. He was eventually overwhelmed and his head taken, but Shimazu himself did make it back eventually to Kyushu, with eighty of his men. Ishida was caught three days after the battle on Mount Ibuki, and executed with other captured leaders of the Western army on the riverbed at Kyoto a few days later.

Ieyasu meanwhile had to be restrained from wreaking similar vengeance on his son when he turned up with his forces just after the battle was concluded. After all, the way was now open for Tokugawa Ieyasu to become shogun and, in due course, for Hidetada to succeed him. It was time, as Ieyasu noted dryly, to tie up his helmet strings.

Other pages of related interest:

• The Battleground at Sekigahara
• The Journey to Sekigahara
• The Outcome of the Battle of Sekigahara

Posted: 27 March 2005 at 6:10am | IP Logged

Lord Tokugawa Ieyasu, who had opposed Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea from the start and managed to avoid any major involvement in the two wars, dominated the Council of Regents. This wealthy daimyo from the Mikawa-Suruga region of eastern Honshu, ruled a domain over twice the size of any other daimyo. His wealth, measured in terms of the rice yield of his land holdings, was 2.5 million koku, or about 12.5 million bushels. The most powerful man in Japan after Toyotomi Hideyoshi's death, Tokugawa was determined to preserve the unity Hideyoshi brought to Japan. He soon made it plain he did not respect Hideyori and was in no mood to support the dead general's five-year-old son. He wanted to become the absolute ruler of Japan himself. Just as happened among the daimyo responsible for counseling Oda Nobunaga's son, Hideyori's Council of Regents became enmeshed in a vicious scramble for power.

Tokugawa Ieyasu took up residence in Hideyoshi's Fushimi-Momoyama Castle in Kyoto, while Maeda Toshiie watched over Hideyori at the mighty Osaka Castle (Figure 1). Hideyoshi had forbid political marriages, since they tended to forge alliances among the daimyo. Tokugawa Ieyasu felt no obligation to follow such an edict and began laying plans to make his family line the new heirs to Japan's leadership. He began by arranging a political marriage between his son and Lord Date Masumune's daughter. Not long afterward, he arranged a wedding between his daughter and the son of Lord Fukushima Masanori.

Over the next few years, Tokugawa gradually consolidated his already substantial power in Japan. Numerous daimyo already viewed him as their de facto lord. Carefully watching Tokugawa's strategy from Osaka, Maeda Toshiie grew evermore concerned about Lord Tokugawa's maneuvering. Ishida Mitsunari, one of the five government commissioners appointed to oversee control of the capital, voiced the first complaints against Tokugawa. Tokugawa rebuffed a demand from Ishida and his colleagues that he resign, which pushed the frustrated Ishida into a failed assassination attempt against Ieyasu. When Maeda Toshiie's son joined forces with Tokugawa after his father's death, Toyotomi Hideyori was left without a guardian. Lord Tokugawa moved into the vacuum by taking up residence in Osaka Castle and became Hideyori's full-time guardian. This situation prompted Lord Ishida and the others to draw up a list of 13 charges, which they forwarded to Osaka Castle. Lord Tokugawa interpreted the document as nothing less than a declaration of war.

Japan's most powerful daimyo quickly began taking sides in the developing struggle, forming two great armies behind the contending warlords. Based in his comparatively new castle at Edo (modern Tokyo) and supported by his family, the Matsudaira, Lord Tokugawa Ieyasu stood as the most powerful individual land-owner in Japan. He had successfully gained the allegiance of such notable daimyo families as the Kato, the Hosokawa, and the Kuroda and held the loyalty of a number of highly skilled commanders, including General Ii Naomasa, who had fought by his side in numerous campaigns. He was without doubt the most ruthless and powerful of the contending warlords. His distinguished military career proved him to be just as pitiless as the next man in the ensuing struggle for supremacy. In light of their strong power base in eastern Japan, Tokugawa's forces are usually called the "Army of the East," or Easterners.

Lord Ishida Mitsunari, better known for his political skills than for his military expertise, commanded forces loyal to Lord Mori Terumoto. Ishida's claim that he supported the interests of Hideyoshi's son, Hideyori, attracted many former allies of the old warlord to his side. Many daimyo from famous families of the recent past rallied to his side, including the Mori of Choshu in western Honshu, the Kobayakawa, the Kikkawa, the Ukita, and the Shimazu of Satsuma. Since most of these families had their power base in western Japan, Ishida's forces are usually called the "Army of the West," or Westerners.

The growing tension erupted into open fighting in July 1600, when Lord Tokugawa was drawn away from the Regent's Council at Osaka to defend his eastern domains from the potential threat of Lord Uesugi Kagekatsu, who was allied with the Ishida Mitsunari faction. After Tokugawa and his allies Date Masumune and Mogami Yoshiakira marched from Osaka to subdue Lord Uesugi, Mori Terumoto took advantage of the situation and moved into Osaka on July 22 and established his military headquarters in the great castle.

With Tokugawa militarily engaged in the east, Lord Ishida promptly called his Western allies to arms to mount a surprise attack against the Eastern Army's rear. The tactic was no surprise to Tokugawa however, whose elaborate spy network kept him constantly informed of exactly what was going on around Kyoto. On July 27, Lord Tokugawa's troops attacked Lord Ishida at Fushimi Castle just south of Kyoto, inflicting 3,000 casualties in a ten-day siege that kept Ishida's forces pinned down in the west. Meanwhile, Tokugawa gathered his allies and set off from Edo in August in a feigned attack against his northern neighbor. He then turned west with his main body of troops to thwart Lord Ishida's intended line of campaign. Moving swiftly, he caught his enemies by surprise on September 28, capturing Gifu Castle, a heavily defended hilltop stronghold overlooking the Nagara River, and the nearby Konosu Castle. The campaign succeeded in blocking the highways into Edo.

News of Tokugawa Ieyasu's lightning-fast advance shocked Lord Ishida, who was at Ogaki Castle, having been delayed by the protracted siege of Fushimi Castle. Furthermore, misinformation spread by Lord Tokugawa's spies confused him into believing that the next advance would be to bypass the mighty Ogaki Castle altogether and attack Ishida's own stronghold at Sawayama, west of the village of Sekigahara . Lord Ishida knew well that such a move would open the Nakasendo Road and leave the path open for Tokugawa's forces to march unopposed to Kyoto, Osaka Castle, and the young Toyotomi Hideyori.

Lord Tokugawa rode from Edo at the head of a 30,000-man army on October 7 to join his allies encamped on the plains northwest of Ogaki near the village of Akasaka. The arrival of Tokugawa's forces on October 20, less than three miles northwest of his position in the mighty Ogaki Castle, convinced Lord Ishida that his rival was indeed going after Sawayama. That night, Lord Ishida Mitsunari, commanding general of the "Army of the West," made a fateful decision. He ordered his army to withdraw from Ogaki and march twelve miles west to defend against Tokugawa's advancing forces and to block any further westward movement by the "Army of the East."  General Kobayakawa Hideaki, whose samurai were already positioned on a hill overlooking the Nakasendo Road and the tiny village of Sekigahara, convinced Lord Ishida that he should defend that area in strength.

Lord Ishida's army endured a night march through the height of a fierce rainstorm that lashed the countryside with strong winds and blinding rain. Other units under Ishida's command marched west along the Nakasendo Road from the village of Tarui to rendezvous at Sekigahara. By the time Ishida's Western Army assembled in the narrow pass at Sekigahara and took up defensive positions, every warrior was totally drenched by the bone-chilling storm. The withdrawal from Ogaki played right into Lord Tokugawa's hands, because despite his inferior numbers, he excelled in open-field combat.

When Lord Tokugawa learned that Ishida had moved his entire army west to Sekigahara, the Eastern Army quickly mobilized and began a night march west from Akasaka along the Nakasendo Road. Leaving the encampment near Akasaka, the Easterners. After a short battle near the virtually undefended Ogaki Castle, Tokugawa's Easterners took control of the Nakasendo Road. Bypassing the strong castle position at Ogaki, the Easterners avoided a costly siege against superior numbers. The worst of the rainstorm had passed by the time Lord tokugawa's men began their march toward Sekigahara, but weather conditions were still so bad that Tokugawa's advance guard inadvertently walked into the rear guard of Ishida's Western forces marching in the same direction as they moved through the village of Tarui.

Sekigahara straddled the Nakasendo Road at the junction of the Ise Road running south and the Hokkoku Road running northwest (Figure 2). Lord Ishida Mitsunari and 4,000 samurai established a headquarters camp behind a palisade on the lower slopes of Mount Sasao overlooking the Hokkoku Road from the northern flank of the valley. To his front, 2,000 samurai under the command of Gamo Bitchu and Shima Sakon readied for battle. Positioned behind Ishida's main force were another 2,000 Toyotomi samurai under Oda Nobutaka, Kishida Tadauji, and Ito Morimasa. The Western Army battle line extended southeast from Ishida's position across the valley floor west of Sekigahara, crossing the Nakasendo Road at Fuwa, site of the old 7th century barrier station. The Shimazu's 3,000 troops took up position on a small hill to protect Ishida's right flank. General Konishi Yukinaga commanded 4,000 Christian samurai on Shimazu's right.

Lord Ishida apparently anticipated the heart of the battle would occur along the Hokkoku Road in the center of the valley north of Sekigahara. On the valley floor between the Hokkoku Road and the Fuji River, General Ukita Hideie commanded 17,000 warriors protecting the center of the battle line on General Konishi's right flank. Another 2,100 samurai under Toda, Hiratsuka and the aging Otani Yosh*tsugu defended the western edge of the valley floor. Lord Ishida positioned Otani Yoshimatsu's 3,500 battle-hardened samurai on a small heavily wooded hill overlooking Fuwa from the north to protect Yosh*tsugu's right flank. Within hours, the lush terrain around Otani's highly trusted command would become a bloody killing ground and the site of the most crucial stage of the impending battle.

Lord Ishida had nagging doubts about the loyalty of some of his commanders to his cause. Unwilling to offend the lot and turn them decidedly against him, Ishida gave the prestigious command of the Western Army's right wing to General Kobayakawa Hideaki, whose loyalty was most in doubt. Kobayakawa's 15,600 samurai were already encamped at the southeastern end of the battle line on a small hill below Mount Nangu overlooking the Nakasendo Road from the south. Ishida believed that sitting so far to the south, Kobayakawa would have little impact on the most serious fighting in the center of the valley. As fate would have it, General Kobayakawa would later confirm Ishida's worst fears.

Moving slowly in conditions where visibility was a matter of yards, Lord Tokugawa Ieyasu's "Army of the East" deployed its battle line somewhat haphazardly during the cold, damp night of October 20-21, depending more on what they could hear from Ishida's lines than on hard intelligence of Ishida's actual positions. Strung out through the village of Sekigahara itself, the greatest weight of Tokugawa's forces were arrayed toward the northern flanks of the valley. In many spots the two sides were just yards apart, certainly within musket range of each other.

Lord Tokugawa set up his headquarters camp east of Sekigahara on a small promontory south of the Nakasendo Road (Figure 3), a position from which he could observe the battle's progress. With his personal command of 30,000 samurai stretched across the Nakasendo Road in reserve well behind the main battle lines, Tokugawa extended his front line troops in a long line stretching from Mount Sasao to Sekigahara. At the northernmost end of the line were 5,400 samurai under command of General Kuroda Nagamasa. On his left flank were the 5,000 samurai of General Hosokawa Tadaoki, followed in turn by General Kato Yoshiaki's 3,000 troops and 2,850 samurai under General Tsutsui Sadatsugu. General Fukushima Masanori dispersed his 6,000 samurai between the Nakasendo Road and Fuji River, a spot that placed him directly in front of General Ukita Hideie's 17,000 warriors.

Standing ready behind the first line of battle, just north of Sekigahara along the Hokkoku Road, General Ii Naomasa's 3,600 samurai, known as the "red devils," backed by 3,000 warriors under command of General Matsudaira Tadayoshi, moved into position north of Sekigahara along the Hokkoku Road, roughly in the center of the Eastern Army's lines. In the third line, dispersed along the Nakasendo Road south of the village, 4,600 samurai under the commands of Furuta Shigekatsu, Oda Yuraku, Kanamori Nagachika, and Ikoma Kazumasa stood ready for battle. Honda Tadakatsu and Tagawa Michiyasu commanded another 900 men stationed along the Ise Road to the southeast of the village.

Few among the men forming ranks in the hills and valleys near Sekigahara on that dark night of October 20, 1600, doubted that a decisive battle was about to take place. The two massive armies, cold, wet and itching for battle, awaited first light and the chance to finally settle the decades-long civil strife among contending clans for leadership of Japan. It had been only two years since Toyotomi Hideyoshi had died, the last man with the power and strength to unify Japan, but who lacked the breeding and authority to become shogun. Ever since that time, Japan's most powerful daimyo, men of noble birth and regents to Hideyoshi's young heir, had continued feuding for absolute power. Lord Tokugawa Ieyasu and Lord Ishida Mitsunari, the two most powerful contenders for the shogunate, were about to throw 154,000 samurai warriors into battle for the final showdown.

SEKIGAHARA

The morning of October 21, 1600, began in cold, gray silence. The heavy rains of the night had diminished to a light drizzle, laying a bone-chilling fog over the hills and valleys around Sekigahara. With visibility restricted to just a few yards at best, no one could see what the other side was doing, so most samurai on both sides were preoccupied with getting warm and drying out clothing soaked during the previous night's maneuvering.

As the dense fog slowly lifted, the front ranks of the two armies on the valley floor saw each other for the first time (Figure 1). Rival generals, eager to fight, anxiously awaited orders to commence the battle. General Ii Naomasa waited for no one. Adorned in bright red armor and a golden-horned helmet, General Ii took the initiative without warning and impetuously charged across the Hokkoku Road just north of Sekigahara, just as Lord Ishida had hoped. At 8 o'clock in the morning, staccato musket fire erupted across the valley as General Ii's "red devils" thundered directly into the front lines of General Ukita's position. General Fukushima Masanori immediately joined the fight, taking his samurai headlong into the center of the Western army's defensive line. The battle had begun.

From his headquarters camp east of Sekigahara, Lord Tokugawa could hear the start of fighting, but with heavy fog still hanging in the valley there was little chance that he saw any of these first developments. By the time visibility improved enough for him to actually witness the developing battle, the pattern of fighting had already been set. His troops were already advancing all along the line against fierce resistance from Ishida's numerically superior troops. The premature start of the battle by General Ii Naomasa committed the Eastern Army to heavy fighting long before Lord Tokugawa's entire command had reached the area. Thousands of Eastern Army troops were still strung out along the Nakasendo Road to the east and had yet to reach the battlefield.

In the northeast, Generals Kuroda, Tanaka, Hosokawa, Kato, and Tsutsui attacked Lord Ishida's forward positions near Mount Sasao. General Kuroda had a personal grudge to settle with Lord Ishida and was determined to reach him first. The 2,000 samurai commanded by Gamo Bitchu and Shima Sakon took cover behind their defensive palisade and unleashed heavy gunfire against the charging Easterners with little effect. After overrunning the palisade defense line, Kuroda led his warriors up the slopes of Mount Sasao towards Ishida's camp. The charge finally halted after absorbing heavy fire from arquebus gunners. Ishida quickly ordered five of his artillery cannon to open fire on the Easterners, who began to withdraw from the slopes. Lord Ishida led a counterattack against General Tanaka, but was turned away when Generals Kato and Hosokawa attacked Ishida's exposed flanks.

On General Ii's left flank, samurai under Kyoguku, Todo, and Terasawa thundered into Otani Yosh*tsugu's combat veterans at the western edge of the valley. General Otani stoutly defended his position against all attacks. Commanders on both sides ordered their warriors into the fight all along the fluid front as fighting degenerated into a battle of attrition throughout the rest of the morning.

At around 10 o'clock that morning, the Kikkawa leader was supposed to give the signal to bring the Mori into the battle, but he did nothing. Before the fighting began, he had sent a messenger to Lord Tokugawa with word that the Kikkawa would defect. Without help from the Mori, the fighting west of Sekigahara slowly turned in favor of the Easterners. By now, most of Tokugawa's men were committed to the fight. Despite the bloody battle raging around the valley floor, the Shimazu, Kobayakawa, and Wakizaka clans had yet to see any action. Lord Ishida saw an opportunity to swing the battle in his favor and decided to make a strong push from the south. When he sent word to the Shimazu to join the fight, he received the following reply;  "In this battle each clan must look to it's own affairs and fight it's own battles with all it's might. There is no time to be concerned with the affairs of others in front, behind, or on either flank."  Stunned by the response, all Ishida could do was rely on the dubious loyalty of General Kobayakawa Hideaki and hope he would do his duty.

Lord Ishida ordered a signal fire lit about 11 o'clock that morning to send General Kobayakawa into the battle to relieve the pressure on Otani by attacking the Easterners from the rear. There was no reaction. A second signal fire was lit soon afterward, but still there was no response. General Otani Yosh*tsugu was not surprised by Kobayakawa's lack of movement, for he had suspected treachery all along. The Mori also saw the signal, knowing it was time for Kikkawa to order them into battle, but still there was no movement.

Lord Tokugawa Ieyasu kept a wary eye on developments at the southern end of the battle front. His mounting tension was already tinged with fury against his own son, Hidetada, who had yet to arrive with his 38,000 troops. If Kobayakawa Hideaki's 15,600 men suddenly moved from their hillside position overlooking the bloody battlefield at the southern end of the line and attacked Lord Tokugawa's exposed southern flank, the Eastern Army's cause would probably be lost. Tokugawa was not a man who depended on luck to win battles. He relied on his own shrewdness, patience and unscrupulous native cunning. Tokugawa's spies had been in action well before the first shots were fired at the Battle of Sekigahara and cleverly convinced Kobayakawa Hideaki to betray Lord Ishida and join Lord Tokugawa's forces.

The dramatic turning point in the battle came shortly after noon. Puzzled by the lack of movement, Lord Tokugawa sent a squad of arquebusiers to fire a volley at Kobayakawa's men and stir them into action. General Kobayakawa leapt to his feet and yelled to his men, "Our target is Otani Yosh*tsugu!"  After watching the morning's killing from their hillside position Kobayakawa's 15,600 samurai finally charged down the hill, directing their blood lust against the ranks of the brave General Otani, whose battle weary men had held their position for the past four hours. Despite being heavily outnumbered by fresh troops, Otani's men held out for a while longer. Soon, Admiral Wakizaka's loyalists decided to follow Kobayakawa's lead and joined the fight against Otani. As his troops were being overrun and before he could be captured, General Otani commanded a retainer to hide his severed head and committed ritual suicide, seppuku.

Having broken Ishida's southern flank, Lord Tokugawa realized that victory would be his. The loss of Otani's strong position and added defections to the Easterners resulted in a rapid collapse of Lord Ishida's battle line in the southeast. General Ukita Hideie had just managed to reestablish his own lines when the Easterners and defectors attacked them in force. By 2 o'clock in the afternoon, Westerners began to break and run all along the front. As the Westerners saw their fleeing comrades, many, including Lord Ishida himself, simply dropped their weapons and fled the battlefield to the safety of the forested northern slopes and the shelter of Mount Ibuki. Only General Shimazu Toyohisa remained, engaged in a fierce melee with General Ii Naomasa's infamous "red devils."

Eventually, Shimazu realized the inevitability of defeat and was persuaded to quit the field of battle. With his escape route to the north cut off, Shimazu's only option was to charge through the center of Lord Tokugawa's lines and try to reach the Ise Road to the south. His boldness paid off. After exchanging helmets with his nephew to confuse the Easterners, he led his surviving 200 samurai in a desperate race to freedom right past the bemused Lord Tokugawa, hotly pursued by Ii Naomasa's warriors. After reaching the Ise Road, Shimazu's brave nephew turned to fight a delaying action with General Ii's samurai. The young man was quickly overwhelmed and his head was taken, but the fatal skirmish allowed his uncle to escape, eventually returning to Kyushu with eighty of his men.

The Battle of Sekigahara was decisive victory. Among the final pursuits of the battle, when the Easterners mopped up remaining pockets of resistance, Lord Ishida's home castle at Sawayama was captured and his brother killed. Lord Tokugawa Ieyasu had to be restrained by his own commanders from taking similar vengeance against his own son, Hidetada, who showed up with his 38,000 samurai just after the end of the fighting. A "heads inspection" was performed at Lord Tokugawa's final encampment just north of Sekigahara along the Hokkoku Road, where he viewed the nearly 40,000 enemy heads taken in battle. Within three days, Lord Ishida Mitsunari was captured in the area of Mount Ibuki and taken to Kyoto with other captive leaders of the Western Army. All were executed on the river bed within a matter of days. Having cleared the path to become the next shogun, Lord Tokugawa Ieyasu sat back on his stool and mused to those in his presence, "After victory, tighten the cords of your helmet."

The Battle of Sekigahara represented the last great leap out of generations of bitter civil warfare in Japan. First and foremost, it established Lord Tokugawa Ieyasu as hegemon over all Japan and ended any claim to supremacy by the Toyotomi family. He permitted the young Toyotomi Hideyori and his mother Yodogimi to retain his residence in Osaka Castle along with 650,000 koku of land in three nearby provinces, but he confiscated the domains of some ninety daimyo outright and reduced the land holdings of many others. Before Sekigahara, all the daimyo had submitted to Toyotomi Hideyoshi. Now, they would have to submit to Tokugawa Ieyasu.

Tokugawa Ieyasu spent the next three years establishing the foundations for a new form of government in Japan. The Tokugawa family made many enemies in their ascent to power. An unsuccessful assassination attempt against Tokugawa Ieyasu following a banquet to celebrate his victory at Sekigahara, left no doubt about the depth of the opposition .

In 1603, Lord Tokugawa realized his life-long ambition when the Imperial Court assigned him the honored title of Shogun. In a purely political gesture, more for show than for practical impact,Tokugawa Ieyasu ordered Lady Yoda and Lord Hideyori to attend his inauguration in Edo as Shogun. After reluctantly accepting the invitation, etiquette demanded they make the trip, they left the safety of Osaka Castle and attended the ceremony without incident under the constant protection of their loyal samurai bodyguard. Thus began the Tokugawa Shogunate. The Tokugawa family sustained a dynasty of fifteen Shoguns and remained the governing power in Japan until 1868, supported by the descendants of the original daimyo warlords.

The last of the three great "unifiers" of sixteenth century Japan, Tokugawa Ieyasu became the first shogun in 150 years to exercise the real power of the office. After establishing his new government in Edo, the new shogun set about building a new ruling government, one that sharply defined the foundation of future political relationships in Japan. Putting politics and loyalties aside, he wisely recognized the many skills and management systems the daimyo used to build and maintain their territories and saw the potential of incorporating these well-managed domains under his rule. The Tokugawa Shogunate operated under the baku-han system, which uniquely blended the best of the traditional centralized bakufu, or "tent government" of the shogun, with the local administrative duties of the daimyo's domain, or han. The shogun held national authority and the daimyo held regional authority.

It was essential that Tokugawa Ieyasu maintain dominance and control over his rivals. Building strong alliances and eradicating all opposition became a deadly serious game that Lord Tokugawa played without mercy. He rapidly abolished numerous enemy daimyo houses, reduced others, such as that of the Toyotomi, and redistributed the spoils of war to his family and allies. He ensured his family's supremacy by bringing the entire country under tight control through a combination of forced submission and written oaths of fealty from the daimyo, bringing his friends and loyal allies in close and pushing his opponents away. Those who would not submit were put to the sword. The price the daimyo had to pay to keep their heads and ensure the continuation of their families, was to be resettled far from their traditional domains to an area where they had no local loyalties that could spark a rebellion. The kunigae, or "changes of provinces," made Japan's great warlords a very mobile class during the first few years of the Tokugawa Shogunate. By carefully separating, even isolating the daimyo, Ieyasu established a very clear feudal hierarchy in Japanese society.

Twenty-three daimyo, all directly related to Tokugawa Ieyasu, were resettled on the borders of the shogun's lands. These were the shinpan or "related houses," families with the closest ties to the Tokugawa lineage. The shinpan were awarded mostly honorary titles and advisory posts in the bakufu. The next class in the feudal hierarchy were the fudai daimyo, or "house daimyo," those who had shown consistent loyalty to Lord Tokugawa, many of whom adopted the family name Matsudaira. They were given small, strategic fiefs close to Tokugawa's holdings for their faithful service, lands that controlled the country's vital communications lines. Many fudai daimyo staffed most of the major bakufu offices, which evolved an increasingly large bureaucracy to administer the mixture of centralized and decentralized authorities. By the eighteenth century, 145 fudai daimyo helped ensure the security of the Tokugawa Shogunate.

Ninety-seven daimyo who had no traditional loyalty to Tokugawa or whose loyalty had only been won by force of arms, the tozama daimyo, or "outer lords," were relocated to the outermost provinces of Japan, far from their original fiefs and far from each other. The tozama daimyo were the least trusted of the daimyo, and were relocated mostly on the periphery of central Honshu, where they collectively controlled nearly 10 million koku of productive land. They were cautiously managed and generously awarded increased land holdings, or at least permitted to hold on to their original estates. The tozama daimyo were rigidly excluded from holding positions in the central government. The distinction between fudai and tozama daimyo remained in effect for the next two-and-a-half centuries.

Although Tokugawa Ieyasu directly controlled one fourth of all Japanese land and regulated all commercial activity, he failed to achieve complete control of the western daimyo. To ensure the success of his new baku-han, he instituted a subtle, yet ingenious arrangement known as sankin kotai, or "alternate attendance" to keep the daimyo in line. The sankin kotai required all daimyo to leave their wives and children permanently in Edo, the Shogun's capital, while they alternated their own residence between Edo and their own han every other year.

The daimyo were not taxed directly, but they were regularly tapped for contributions to provide military and logistical support and for such public works projects as roads, bridges, castles, and palaces. The various regulations and levies combined with sankin kotai, not only strengthened the Tokugawa Shogunate, but depleted the wealth of the daimyo, thus weakening their threat to the central government. The han, once the military-centered domains of warlords, became mere local administrative units for the bakufu.

As the Tokugawa family consolidated its control over a reunified Japan, it also took on unprecedented power over the emperor, the imperial court, all daimyo, and religious orders in the country. The emperor was elevated as the ultimate political sanction for the shogun's ruling power, who ostensibly was the vassal of the imperial family. Under the Tokugawa Shogunate, Japan enjoyed the longest period of uninterrupted peace in its history. The brilliant and ruthless administration of the Tokugawa Shoguns and their strict policy of seclusion created the crucible that spawned a flowering of Japanese culture and ultimately forged the temperament of modern Japan.

Posted: 27 March 2005 at 6:13am | IP Logged

Shortly after he retired as shogun, Tokugawa Ieyasu began making overtures to reestablish relations between Japan and Choson. He designated the So daimyo on Tsushima Island as his agent in the management of Choson affairs. In 1605, he directed the So daimyo to make contact with the Yi government through its agents in Pusan (Figure 1). Choson agreed to reestablish contact with the Japanese in return for the repatriation of several thousand prisoners taken to Japan after the invasions. The following year, the first formal embassy from Choson traveled the long sea route from Pusan to Tsushima to Osaka, then overland to the shogun's residence in Edo. The Yi government insisted that Japan's central government conduct all its business either through Choson's visiting embassy in Edo or through Tsushima.

The most important principle governing Japanese-Choson relations was titular equality. This belief technically put the Yi king below the Japanese emperor in titular precedence, a serious matter in traditional East Asia, where status was all important in the conduct of foreign affairs. The Yi dynasty was not unaware of the disturbing implications of the presence of Japan's emperor, the mikado. Though politically impotent for centuries, the mikado remained the lawful sovereign of the land. The institution of the mikado sustained the widely held Japanese belief that early peninsula kingdoms such as Paekche and Silla were actually tributary states of Yamato Japan. While the shogun was a hereditary ruler with dictatorial powers based on military conquest, he ruled, in theory at least, by right of the authority delegated to him by the emperor. Choson regarded the Tokugawa shogun as Japan's sovereign ruler. Although the bakufu felt uneasy about Choson addressing the shogun as "King of Japan," it reluctantly agreed to use that title in its communications with Choson at the insistence of the Yi court.

At Japan's request, beginning in the early eighteenth century the shogun was addressed as the "Great Prince," - taikun in Japanese, taegun in Korean. Regardless of the title, the Choson king and the Shogun Tokugawa treated each other as equals and their gifts to each other were fixed in amount and considered equal in value. The Yi government regarded its relationship with Japan as purely contractual in nature and origin and insisted the two countries conduct their relationship on the basis of strict agreements that spelled out mutual commitments and obligations.

Choson's deeply ingrained Confucian viewpoint defined its historical relationship with China as a natural familial bond that could be broken under very few circumstances. Choson was free to maintain relations with Japan, but its tributary obligations to China dictated that it could never accord Japan the same status as China. Historical experience had convinced the people of Choson that Japan was treacherous and untrustworthy and the Yi government felt no compelling political reason or cultural need to maintain a similar close tie with the Japanese. Moreover, because Choson traditionally enjoyed favored relations with the Chinese and had in the past acted as the carrier of Chinese culture to Japan, Choson tended to regard itself as culturally superior to the Japanese. It was inconceivable to them that Japan could be anything more than an equal in a world hierarchy centered on China. The Tokugawa shoguns had no ambition for continental conquest or expansion and tacitly acknowledged Chinese supremacy and cultural leadership in the East Asian world. Unlike Hideyoshi, they understood and accepted Choson's position.

The 1609 Trade Agreement between Choson and the daimyo of Tsushima finally normalized relations by permitting twenty merchant ships to call at the port of Pusan each year. Under the terms of the agreement, Choson conducted relations with Japan through both the domain of Tsushima and the bakufu in Edo. Although Choson's relationship with the bakufu took precedence over its relationship with Tsushima, its embassies to Edo were infrequent and usually made only to carry the king's messages and gifts to the shogun and to take home the Japanese replies and gifts. In addition to regular envoys authorized by the agreement, Tsushima used every conceivable pretext and device to send as many special envoys, messengers and trading ships to Choson as possible. More than one thousand officials, merchants and sailors visited Choson annually. Regardless of the nature of their mission however, no Tsushima daimyo could communicate with any Choson official higher than the Vice Minister of Rites. The 1609 Trade Agreement became the sole legal basis for Choson-Japanese relations for the next two hundred sixty-eight years.

Choson sent eleven missions to Edo between 1606 and 1793. These large embassies, each led by "communication envoys," usually numbered close to 500 people. According to Japanese tradition, visitors to Japan had all their transportation, food, lodging and entertainment expenses covered by the government. Hosting these large entourages from Choson became a very expensive proposition. Over the years, the infrequent missions between Choson and Tsushima caused many Japanese holders of Yi titles and seals to terminate their ties with Korea. At the request of Tsushima's daimyo, Choson transferred some of their privileges to him along with an annual allowance of 100 bushels of rice and 100 bushels of beans. By the mid-eighteenth century, the So clan held such a monopoly on diplomacy and trade between Japan and Choson they virtually assumed the role of political intermediary between the two governments. In effect, they conducted what amounted to their own foreign policy, a position they jealously guarded.

Japan restricted Choson embassies to the island of Tsushima after 1763. Japan imposed the travel restriction in part because of the tremendous expense involved, but also because Choson refused to permit any Japanese representative to travel beyond the traditional entry point of Pusan. Japanese envoys were restricted to the Japan House, or Waegwan, a large compound built in 1678 on approximately fifty acres maintained by the Yi government in the Ch'oryang section of Pusan. The large walled enclosure of the official Japanese inn contained business and diplomatic offices, residences, warehouses and marketplaces. Landward, a high stone wall surrounded the grounds. Seaward, the compound opened onto a walled-in anchorage. Choson authorities provided some 3,000 bags of rice per year to help feed the visiting Japanese and took responsibility for physical maintenance and security of the Japan House.

Although Ch'oryang had its own magistrate, trade supervisor and police force, the Tsushima government permanently stationed a Japanese official and staff at Japan House to manage its day-to-day affairs. A large Japanese population lived within this walled community under the jurisdiction of the local government administration at Tongnae a few miles inland. To interdict black market trading and to keep national secrets from reaching Japan, six nearby guard posts kept close watch on the compound, its stone wall and gates. Choson authorities also erected a large stone slab near the Waegwan inscribed with the terms of the agreement between Choson's envoy to Japan, Yun Chi-wan, and the Tsushima daimyo regarding the management of the Japan House and its residents. The engraved text read:

1. Whoever violates the boundary (wall) shall be punished with death.
2. Both the donor and recipient of any commission shall be punished with death.
3. Anyone who sneaks into the community to conduct illegal trade shall be punished with death.
4. The town officials, storehouse keepers and interpreters should not beat the Japanese traders during the trade fair that takes place every five days.
5. Criminals of either side shall be executed outside the gate of the community.

Three times each month Pusan held market fairs that lasted for three days where merchants from Choson and Japan bartered goods at fixed rates of exchange. The fact that Choson merchants traded surplus items from their trade with China provided a major incentive for Japanese merchants to attend the Pusan market fairs. The Japanese brought such items as silver, copper, lead, alum, cinnabar and porcelain to trade for rice, soybeans, ginseng, and other Choson products. Lacquered articles such as folding screens, tables and gold-inlay saddles were traded in these fairs along with such surplus products from Japan's European trade as sandalwood, black pepper and water buffalo horn. The Tongnae market provided such items as cotton cloth, silks, tiger and leopard skins, hunting birds, writing brushes and medicines. A variety of new plants entered Choson through the Pusan marketplace during the seventeenth century, most notably cotton and tobacco.

The merchants who profited from the resumption of foreign trade welcomed the restoration of peaceful relations with Japan, but "peaceful relations" did little to erase the animosity felt by the Choson people toward Japan. Badly scarred by historical experience, the deeply buried hatred lived in their hearts long afterwards. Choson developed a profound distrust of its neighbors during the seventeenth century and drastically reduced its contacts with both China and Japan. As a result, a form of national seclusion took hold in Korea that became tighter and more restrictive than the Japanese movement toward seclusion which began in 1587, when Toyotomi Hideyoshi issued his first edict prohibiting Christianity.

Tokugawa Ieyasu worried less about foreign threats to his newly-formed government than about native-born threats, many of which had deadly intent. Lord Sanada Yokimura and the few remnants of his family who survived a merciless campaign by Lord Tokugawa some years earlier took refuge at the Buddhist monastery on Mount Kuro in Kyushu. Female monks of the Takeda clan, who had no great love for the new Shogun, developed an extensive network of spies and secret agents and agreed to help Lord Sanada extract his revenge on their common enemy. Together they sought the assistance of a ninja clan led by Hakune Saitozawa. When the shogun's spies brought news of the impending alliance, Ieyasu made an unsuccessful attempt to offer Hakune a position in the newly formed government. When the Ninja master refused, Ieyasu's agents promptly killed him and burned his houses to the ground.

Such assaults against the shogunate prompted Tokugawa Ieyasu to move against Hideyori and his mother. Under the pretext that the two had broken their earlier agreement by keeping samurai retainers within Osaka Castle after the Western Army had been disbanded, Lady Yodo was ordered to the Imperial Court in Edo, where she was made a hostage. Lord Hideyori was retired to Oyuji Temple in Hodiyuji. Throughout this period, the shogunate maintained the myth that with the young Lord in his traditional place at Osaka and the Lady Yoda as a guest of Ieyasu the government was running smoothly. Lady Yodo rejected the plan altogether however, claiming that Lord Tokugawa, a former vassal of the Toyotomi clan, had broken his oath of fealty first. Therefore, the young Lord would fight for his throne.

To Lord Tokugawa, the continued existence of the Toyotomi family in Osaka presented a threat with the greatest potential for damage. He knew that tradition-minded Japanese would never tolerate an open attack against Hideyori. Ieyasu also knew that Hideyori's mother, Lady Yodo, would never let her son take the field against him, for the Shogun would then have to kill him. Beginning in about 1611, Tokugawa Ieyasu employed subterfuge and political intrigue to undercut Hideyori's potential strength. He effectively split the forces in the pro-Toyotomi faction by sowing the seeds of doubt and mistrust among rival daimyo and weakened the young heir's defensive potential even further by offering generous rewards to Hideyoshi's former generals. As tensions between Tokugawa Ieyasu and Toyotomi Hideyori steadily rose, Hideyori issued an appeal for assistance. Many of the daimyo who had served his father, Hideyoshi, or who felt the sting of defeat at Sekigahara pledged their support.

One group with a particularly deep-seeded enmity toward the new shogun, the ninjas of the Black Dragon Fighting Society, began a personal campaign to kill Tokugawa Ieyasu. During one of the shogun's journeys to Osaka, ninja agents planted a series of explosive charges beneath the road to Osaka. As the palanquin column carrying the shogun marched over the ambush site, the charges were detonated. During the ensuing confused fighting, which forced Ieyasu to flee on foot, all but one of the attackers were killed, screaming to the end they had come from Lord Sanada Yokimura to claim the head of Ieyasu in revenge for the murder of his father, Lord Sanada Masayuki.

Lord Sanada Yokimura allied himself with the ninja of the Takeda clan and gathered a team of ronin, outlawed Christians, actors, wanderers, and any other sworn enemies of Ieyasu with a mutual vow they would never rest until the shogun was dead. Acting on intelligence gathered by their own spies, the Black Dragons set in motion plans to assassinate Ieyasu at a camp near Nagura Castle, where he planned to watch the test firing of several cannon smuggled into Japan from Holland. Tokugawa Ieyasu reasoned that such artillery would be necessary to successfully storm the previously impregnable Osaka Castle. The attackers pumped oil from a contaminated well into the river that ran through the camp near the powder magazines, then ignited the surface of the water with torches. The resulting fire spread rapidly into the camp, destroying everything, including the cannon. Tokugawa Ieyasu barely escaped with his life.

By the autumn of 1614, Hideyori had assembled some 90,000 men at his fortress in Osaka. Always ready to grasp an opportunity when it appeared, Tokugawa Ieyasu used the assassination attempt as an excuse to attack the Toyotomi. Tokugawa Ieyasu marched west from Edo at the head of an army some 195,000 strong to lay siege to Osaka Castle (Figure 2). The campaign began in mid-November with a number of minor engagements in the area around the main castle. By November 29, Tokugawa's warriors captured the fort guarding the approaches to the Kizu River, thereby preventing western reinforcements from relieving Osaka by river. After maneuvering closer to the walls of Osaka Castle, Ieyasu launched a massive attack against the stockade protecting the outer approaches to the moat surrounding the castle grounds. The fighting on December 4 succeeded in broaching the stockade, but the Easterners suffered very high casualties and had to withdraw. Lord Tokugawa had little choice but to starve out the castle defenders with a long siege through the dead of winter.

Despite bringing 300 cannon on to the field to bombard Osaka Castle and setting miners to digging under the castle's defensive walls, there seemed little chance of breaking the stalemate any time soon. Hideyori, now in his early twenties, faced a battle-scarred warrior in his early seventies determined to put an end to the pro-Toyotomi faction. As a gesture to end the siege, Lord Tokugawa offered to conclude an armistice, allowing that Hideyori would remain in possession of Osaka Castle and Tokugawa would withdraw his armies, provided the Toyotomi faction would allow him to destroy some of the Osaka fortifications and that no rebellion would be staged in the future. The Toyotomi relented with the understanding that only the outer ramparts and the outer moat would be destroyed.

The winter siege of Osaka Castle ended with the signing of a peace agreement on January 22, 1615. Before leaving Osaka, Ieyasu ordered the great castle's outer moats to be filled with earth. Hideyori protested, since this had not been part of the agreement, but Ieyasu stalled, replying that with their peace agreement now in force, there was no further need for such defenses. By the time Osaka's defenders discovered they had been tricked, the outer moats had practically vanished and Tokugawa's army filled the castle's two inner moats as well.

The peace agreement held until the spring of 1615, when Ieyasu learned that Hideyori had ordered the moats around Osaka excavated. Ieyasu took this action as evidence that Hideyori was violating the treaty agreement and declared open war. Both sides began marshaling armies for another great battle, the end game in a longstanding struggle for supremacy in Japan. Tokugawa Ieyasu, commanding an army 250,000 warriors, intended to destroy the nearly 120,000 Westerners who had flocked to Hideyori's banner. Unlike the campaign the previous winter however, this time the Westerners would be the ones to take the fight to the Tokugawa.

Fighting began in late April with a series of ambush attacks against advanced Eastern Army units en route to Osaka. On April 29, 1615, 3,000 Western troops launched an unsuccessful attack against Wakayama Castle southwest of Osaka, held by 5,000 samurai under the command of Asano Nagaakira. The Westerners were forced to withdraw to Osaka, leaving behind a number of casualties. On May 2, Hideyori's war council assessed the battlefield situation and decided the Western Army would go on the offensive against Ieyasu and take the fight to the Easterners. Success would depend on taking control of high terrain commanding the approaches to Osaka.

At 4 o'clock on the morning of May 6, General Goto Mototsugu led a force of 2,800 warriors under cover of heavy fog to positions southeast of Osaka Castle. His plan was to intercept the Eastern Army in the steep mountainous terrain near the Domyo Temple at the junction of the Yamato and Kawachi prefectures and take and hold the high ground south of the Yamato River against the Eastern Army until relieved by Sanada and Mori. Attacking through the dense morning fog, General Goto's men soon found themselves engaged with nearly 23,000 troops under the command of Date Masumune, Mizuno Katsushige, Honda Tadamasa, and Matsudaira Tadaaki. After some initial success in pushing the Easterners back, a strong counterattack forced Goto to withdraw to Mount Komatsu where he held his ground, anxiously awaiting reinforcements from Mori and Sanada. Western reinforcements, still trying to find their way in the heavy fog, never arrived. Vastly outnumbered, the Easterners held their position until around mid-morning, when General Goto was mortally wounded by a bullet in the chest. After ordering his retainers not to give the enemy his head, Goto Mototsugu committed seppuku. His position was quickly overrun.

From Osaka Castle, Mori Katsunaga and Sanada Yukimura arrayed 12,000 warriors in a new battle line along the northern bank of the Yamato River. The morning fog finally lifted by late morning, revealing the presence of the Eastern Army south of the river. Fresh from destroying General Goto's small force, the Easterners crossed the river and began a fierce battle that lasted until about noon, when both sides finally withdrew with heavy losses. Two other battles that day at Hachio and Wakae resulted in Western Army defeats. The Western offensive had failed. The next day, May 7, 1615, Toyotomi Hideyori committed everything at his disposal to an all out attack against the armies of Tokugawa.

The filled moats around Osaka Castle stripped the once formidable stronghold of much of its defensive power. Toyotomi Hideyori knew that if the Eastern Army besieged the castle again, all would be lost. They had to leave the castle grounds and fight Tokugawa in the open. The plan was for Sanada Yukimura to command some 55,000 samurai in a frontal attack against the Eastern lines near the sh*tennoji Temple, while Akashi Morishige maneuvered approximately 16,500 soldiers to attack the Tokugawa from behind. Once the battle got underway, Hideyori would lead his 3,000 troops from the castle under his father's "thousand gourd" battle standard.

No longer did Tokugawa Ieyasu have to worry about Toyotomi's supporters being scattered about Japan. This day they were all here - at Osaka. The Western Army, including its main line troops and reserves, was spread across the open landscape south of Osaka Castle, stretching from near the sh*tennoji Temple, founded in 593 by Prince Shotoku, north to the castle's outer moat. Facing this massive colorful army were nearly 155,000 men under the command of Tokugawa Hidetada, including a reserve force of approximately 57,000 and a rear guard of 10,000 warriors. Ieyasu told his commanders to have all mounted troops dismount for the battle.

At around noon on May 7, just after the Westerners marched into view of the Easterners, Mori Katsunaga's ronin immediately opened fire on vanguard units of the Eastern Army. Lord Sanada Yukimura desperately tried to call off the attack, but the overeager riflemen only increased their rate of fire, checking the planned flanking attack against the Eastern Army's rear. After quickly consulting with Lord Mori Katsunaga, Sanada decided to go ahead and order the attack. Orders were immediately sent down the lines as Lord Mori led his men in a frontal attack against the Tokugawa vanguard, breaking their ranks and continuing toward the main army units to the rear.

As the pace of fighting quickened, Lord Sanada ordered his son back to Osaka Castle to bring Hideyori into the battle. Sanada, meanwhile, led his samurai in a charge into the Eastern lines. Almost simultaneously and without orders, the Eastern commander Asano Nagakira moved forward to reinforce the battle by engaging Sanada. The unexpected move caused Easterners to fear that Asano had turned traitor and many began to panic and run. Tokugawa commanders quickly brought order to their lines and continued the push northward against the Westerners. As the Easterners continued their push, the exhausted Lord Sanada paused to rest. A samurai named Nishio Nizaemon challenged Sanada, who was too tired to accept. News of Lord Sanada's death spread quickly through the ranks.

As the Easterners pressed the attack, the stubborn Western Army unleashed its reserves against Hidetada. Had General Akashi Morishige's 16,500 samurai attacked Tokugawa's exposed rear flank at that moment, they might have routed the Eastern Army, but they had been intercepted earlier and the attack never materialized. Under mounting pressure all along the battle front, the Westerners finally broke and fled. Tokugawa's army hotly pursued the Westerners north like a giant seine net herding a school of panicked fish, funneling their catch toward the Sakura Gate at the southern end of Osaka Castle. When Hideyori finally decided to leave the castle and fight, it was too late. With his army fleeing toward the castle, Hideyori retired to the castle Keep for protection.

Artillery units moved forward and began a massive bombardment of Osaka Castle. By 5 o'clock in the afternoon, with the castle engulfed in flames, Tokugawa warriors broke through the Sakura Gate and easily overran the castle. The end came without compassion or mercy. As artillery shells continued to pound the castle well into the night, Toyotomi Hideyori knew beyond all doubt that his time had come to an end. Deep within the castle Keep, Hideyori and his family committed suicide. Hideyori's eight-year-old son, the last of the Toyotomi, was beheaded. Only two small children of the family survived the clan bloodbath that followed when Tokugawa's warriors relentlessly hunted down, executed and publicly displayed the heads of thousands of Toyotomi supporters. Never again would the Toyotomi family rise to challenge Tokugawa authority. The final battle had been won. Tokugawa authority was now the complete master of Japan.

Posted: 27 March 2005 at 6:23am | IP Logged

Sekigahara is a small village in Gifu Prefecture, yet every Japanese person knows its name. Located in a strategic pass through which ancient Nakasendo highway passes on its way to Kyoto, in 1600 on September 15th, this quiet village was the scene of the greatest battle in Japanese history.

Two years had passed since the death of Toyotomi Hideyoshi. His young son Hideyori was too young to rule, and the five regents who Toyotomi Hideyoshi had selected to protect his son, had soon divided into factions in pursuit of absolute power. The leaders of these two factions were Ishida Mitsunari, and Tokugawa Ieyasu.

The leadup to the battle of Sekigahara began in the summer. On June 16th, Tokugawa Ieyasu had to leave the Regent's Council in Osaka and move back to his base in Edo (now Tokyo), in order to protect his territories from a threat posed by Uesugi Kagekatsu (allied to the Ishida faction). Knowing that a major showdown was likely, he left a castellan in control of Osaka Castle, another garrison at Fushimi Castle under the command of Torii Mototada (who pledged to Tokugawa Ieyasu that he would defend the bastion to the last man if attacked), and moved slowly north engaging in diplomacy - shoring up alliances, mending fences, gathering intelligence - and preparing to attack the Uesugi's strongly built mountain fortress, Aizu castle.

Tokugawa Ieyasu's plan to destroy Aizu castle involved combining the armies of the Tokugawa, Satake, Date, Mogami and Maeda. The Uesugi were to be surrounded, then eliminated. On July the 8th, Sakakibara Yasumasa who was one of Tokugawa's best commanders (he had been a key figure in the battles at Nagakute against Toyotomi Hideyoshi's forces in 1584) set out for Aizu with the advance force. Nearly two weeks later, Ieyasu's son and heir Tokugawa Hidetada lead the main force of 37,000 troops north, and at the same time thousands more samurai and ashigaru (foot soldiers and musketmen) from the Date, Maeda, Mogami, and from less powerful lords, began advancing on the Uesugi's territories from the north, east and west. On the 21st, Tokugawa Ieyasu himself set out with an additional 32,000 troops.

Only an attack from the west could save Aizu from inevitable destruction. Ishida Mitsunari and several collaborators quickly denounced Ieyasu, demanded that Torii Mototada surrender his control of Fushimi Castle (which could dominate Kyoto), and began mobilizing forces for an invasion of the east. Suspecting this would happen, Tokugawa Ieyasu had advanced towards Aizu slowly - taking 5 days march to reach Oyama, a distance of 65 kilometers (approx. 40 miles) that could usually be covered in one day's ride, but that was conveniently close to the fast flowing Tone river.

The situation was extremely unstable. One by one, important daimyo (often in strategically vital territories) were siding with Ishida. The most important of all was Mori Terumoto. The ruler of the second largest feudal domain in Japan, Mori controlled lands worth more than 1 million koku from his powerbase in Hiroshima. Quickly ousting the castellan guard at Osaka Castle, troops coordinated by Mori and Ishida attacked Fushimi Castle - which they could not afford to leave in the hands of Torii Mototada's forces before launching their campaign to the east to destroy the Tokugawa. Ishida's plans were to eliminate the treat posed by Fushimi, then advance east.

Further defections to the army of the west would politically and militarily isolate Tokugawa Ieyasu completely. In the north came the disturbing news that the Satake were refusing to attack the Uesugi. Tokugawa Ieyasu had to advance west, but could not leave his territories vulnerable to an attack from the rear during his absence. His son Tokugawa Hidetada was ordered to destroy the Satake, meanwhile the attack on the Uesugi had to be indefinitely postponed. Leaving lesser lords to keep the Uesugi hemmed in their mountain base, Ieyasu had to move west. His earlier caution was to pay quick dividends. Once he had been informed by a messenger from Torii Mototada of Ishida's demands, and from his spy network of the extent of danger faced, Tokugawa Ieyasu was able to quickly return to Edo by river boat down the fast flowing Tone river.

The only daimyo quick to rally to his support were those in the Mikawa (eastern Aichi) to Suruga areas along the Pacific coast. These included men such as Ikeda Terumasa, who had fought for Toyotomi Hideyoshi against the Tokugawa in 1584 during the Komaki and Nagakute campaigns (in which his father Ikeda Nobuteru had been killed). After Tokugawa Ieyasu transferred to the Kanto region in 1590, Ikeda Terumasa established himself at Yoshida castle in eastern Mikawa (Ieyasu's home province), and in 1594 married one of Tokugawa's daughters. Tokugawa Ieyasu's earlier diplomacy and caution began paying off as one by one these daimyo threw their support to the Tokugawa. Another reason was that as their domains were former Tokugawa territories that Ieyasu knew intimately, their lands would have been hard to defend. While undertaking quick preparations in Edo castle, Ieyasu wrote letters to 108 of the 214 daimyo. Of these, 99 of the replies offered support.

The forces of Ishida and Mori overran Fushimi castle, Torii Mototada defending the castle to the last man and buying Tokugawa Ieyasu 10 very valuable days. This accomplished, the main body of the western army could now advance through Ishida's home province of Ohmi (his castle was Sawayama, near present day Hikone) to the east. The army of the west, as the coalition is often referred to, destroyed several minor castles and fortresses held by Tokugawa supporters, took complete control of Ise province and the western portions of the Tokaido highway, stormed forward from this considerable base onto the Owari plain (now the western part of Aichi Prefecture) capturing Ogaki castle, and sending more troops to the strategically important Gifu castle commanded by Oda Hidenobu, to gain his support as well as a key base astride the Nakasendo.

Once again, Tokugawa Ieyasu's caution, diplomacy and preparation paid off. Ikeda Terumasa attacked and seized Gifu castle, giving Ieyasu a strong forward position that he could supply via both the Nakasendo and Tokaido. Ikeda and the other daimyo who had rallied to the Tokugawa then pressed a further 20 kilometers (approx. 12 miles) west and established defensive field positions at Akasaka - blocking the main route of advance of the western army and immobolizing the troops who had captured Ogaki castle. This bought Tokugawa Ieyasu more time, and he arrived after a long forced march from Edo with 32,000 plus troops to a campsite prepared by Ikeda. The scene was set for the showdown, the first major question was where would it happen?

The second major question was the whereabouts of Tokugawa Hidetada, and the main force of some 38,000 troops. Hidetada had promptly destroyed the recalcitrant Satake, and then deployed to Kai. The plan had been for for Hidetada to advance along the Nakasendo while his father marched down the Tokaido, meet in Owari Province and then use their combined numbers and firepower to defeat the western army. Hidetada's force had been at Karuizawa on September 1st (the day that Ieyasu had departed Edo), however bad weather (the Nakasendo traverses a mountainous route) and a siege of Ueda Castle (Shinano Province), and to some extent poor communications delayed his advance. The siege of Ueda was a particularly bad decision. Ordered by Ieyasu to isolate the castle, Hidetada instead decided to capture it. The problem was that Ueda castle was defended by the 56 year old veteran Sanada Masayuki, a skilled general and more than a match for the 21 year old Hidetada. 4 days were lost before Hidetada abandoned his attempt to destroy the castle and resumed his march south. The end result was that during the strategy sessions taking place at Akasaka, Ieyasu had to come to terms with the fact that just over half of his main army was still some 200 kilometers (approx. 125 miles) away, and there was no certainty as to the timing of its arrival.

In Akasaka, the debate was whether to engage Ogaki castle, or surround it and then bypass it in order to attack Ishida's home province on the other side of the Sekigahara pass. Ii Naomasa, a trusted retainer who had joined Ieyasu before the battle of Nagashino some 25 years earlier, advocated attacked Ogaki. Ieyasu, mindful that he was without Hidetada's troops and that a successful attack on Sawayama castle would not only destroy Ishida's powerbase, but would also leave the road to Kyoto and Osaka open, decided to leave sufficient troops at Ogaki to contain the units there, and move forward. Morale in the eastern camp was high.

The situation was completely different in the western camp. Leadership was an issue, with a lack of trust between the various commanders a key contributor. Communications and preparations were less than adequate, formations slower to deploy. The true cost of the 10 day siege of Fushimi castle was beginning to hurt. Other sieges hurt even more - 15,000 men besieged the castle of Hosokawa Yusai at Tanabe in Tango province on the Sea of Japan coast, and these troops never reached the battlefield of Sekigahara. The castle was defended by a garrison of just 500 men. Another castle, this time the strategically vital Otsu castle at the southern end of Lake Biwa defended by 3000 troops under Kyogoku Takatsugu, kept another 15,000 troops away from the battlefield. Mori Terumoto, who was Mitsunari's most important ally, was deliberatingly keeping some 30,000 of his troops in Osaka. Rumours of betrayal and shifting loyalties abounded.

Most frustrating of all was poor intelligence and an inability to track the maneuvers and deployments of the Tokugawa. The number of daimyo supporting Ieyasu was a frustration and surprise for Ishida Mitsunari, as was the speed with which Ieyasu had managed to move large numbers of men from Kanto to Owari, capturing Gifu as well. According to the plans, Tokugawa Ieyasu was supposed to be north of Edo fighting the Uesugi. Yet Mitsunari's forward units were reporting that instead Ieyasu was armed to the teeth and directly opposite their lines. Even more disturbing was Ieyasu's strategic positioning, Mitsunari immediately realized that unless he moved immediately, he could soon be cut off from Sawayama and Kyoto and surrounded.

To evade the trap, the army of the west decided to move at once to the narrow pass of Sekigahara, leaving a garrison of 7,500 men at Ogaki, and block the route west. Heavy rain began to fall, and forward units of the Tokugawa army were able to harass the rearguard units as they made their way through the night to Sekigahara. Despite the foul weather and heavy rain, trees were felled to build palisades to protect the musketmen from cavalry, and earthworks constructed. There was little opportunity to sleep or cook, and when morning came the plain was covered in dense fog limiting visibility. The prime objective of most of the men was to get some fires going to help dry out - particularly those who had been unable to keep gunpowder protected from the weather.

Ishida Mitsunari placed his headquarters on the northern flank of the western army, on a spur of Mount Sasao that commanded the Nakasendo and offered a good view of the entire battlefield. On the south flank, also in a strong position were the 15,600 troops of Kobayakawa Hideaki on Mount Matsuo, and in the center, also in a strong position due to high ground at the base of Mount Tengu, The 17,000 men commanded by Ukita Hideie and other units. In short, the army of the west had a strong defensive position. The position was even stronger, because nearly 28,000 more troops were on Mount Nangu, as it placed them in a perfect position to encircle Tokugawa Ieyasu's reserve units and trap the eastern forces.

There had been numerous skirmished during the deployments of the night, but the battle didn't begin in earnest until the fog lifted around 8am, when Ii Naomasa's troops charged Ukita Hideie's position in the center of the western line. As the matchlock arquebusiers (a type of firearm introduced to Japan by the Portuguese from the middle of the 16th century) of the troops commanded by Fukushima Masanori (Owari province) tore into the Ukita battalions, other units began to attack the western army across the line, including Ishida's position. A fierce battle of attrition began with appalling casualties in the muddy fields of the plain. The army of the west had a numerical superiority, and the absence of Tokugawa Hidetada with the bulk of the Tokugawa army was crucial. It looked like the army of the west was going to win the day.

At this stage of the battle, Ishida lit a pre-arranged signal fire to order Kobayakawa Hideaki (15,600 men) on the right flank, and the units on Mount Nangu behind Tokugawa Ieyasu into action. To Ishida's immense dismay, the units did not move. Runners were sent, but to no avail. Ishida did not know, that in the lead up to the battle Kobayakawa had been offered lands by Tokugawa Ieyasu in exchange for secretly agreeing to switch sides during the decisive battle. When Kobayakawa finally did command his troops to attack (prompted by volleys of musket fire from Tokugawa's troops to "remind" him of his secret undertaking), his forces crashed through the lines of the Otani and Ukita troops, not those of Tokugawa Ieyasu.

The entire center of the army of west began to disintegrate. Ishida himself fled the battlefield (along with many of his men) to nearby Mount Ibuki where he was captured 3 days later, taken to Kyoto and beheaded. Months of preparation and manuvering led to a decisive encounter that was all over in about 6 hours. Casualties were appalling, particularly for the west.

Towards the end the battle, Ii Naomasa was wounded by a musket shot during savage fighting with the Shimazu forces, who had continued to hold their lines. The Shimazu realized that they faced immiment defeat, and that the withdrawal route was now blocked by flanking forces. In an reckless and audacious move, they decide to withdraw from the battlefield - not to the rear but by instead advancing straight through the center of the Tokugawa lines. It says something of the sheer chaos of the situation that this was successful - albeit with further carnage inflicted by the Ii - riding straight past Ieyasu's headquarters. Only a handful of Shimazu's men, some 80 in total, reached Kyushu safely. His nephew was one of those who didn't make it, loosing his head (literally) after swapping helmets with his uncle to assist with the escape. Such sacrifices were common at Sekigahara.

Satsuma, a feudal domain located in the southern part of Kyushu with a castle town at Kagoshima, continued to be ruled during the Edo period by the Shimazu family. Satsuma was also one of the four domains which overthrew the Tokugawa shogunate in the Meiji Restoration that restored the Emperor to authority in 1868. Men from Satsuma and Choshu dominated government in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries. During the Edo period, Satsuma was prevented from having a national role because the domain fought against the Tokugawa at the battle of Sekigahara in 1600. The resentment felt by the Satsuma was one of the reasons for the Meiji Restoration. The scars of Sekigahara never really healed.