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Subject Topic: THE LAST STATEMENT OF TORII MOTOTADA Post ReplyPost New Topic
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JKO_RONIN
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Posted: 11 December 2004 at 7:40pm | IP Logged Quote JKO_RONIN

"For myself, I am resolved to make a stand within the castle and to die a quick death. It would not take much trouble to break through a part of their numbers and escape, no matter how many tens of thousands of horsemen approached for the attack or by how many columns we were surrounded. But that is not the true meaning of being a warrior, and it would be difficult to account as loyalty....."

 






Torii Mototada was a feudal Lord in the service of Tokugawa Ieyasu.  In August, 1600 he was forewarned by spies that an army of 40,000 battle hardened followers of Toyotomi Hideyoshi were annihilating everything in their path on their march to Fushimi Castle.   Torii Mototada chose to remain behind with his garrison, even though he was badly outnumbered and could have easily escaped. He pledged that his bastion would fight to the finish.  Torii Mototada and Ieyasu Tokugawa parted ways sadly knowing that they would never see each other again.  

Torii Mototada penned a farewell letter to his son, reprinted below. In his final words, he proudly recounts how his father and grandfather served the Tokugawa before him and his own brother has already been killed in battle.   He advises his son to remain humble, not to aspire for lordship or desire money.  He also asks him to raise his younger brothers to serve Ieyasu and remain loyal "to the end of time".

In the end, with the castle in flames around him, Mototada ordered his men to charge headlong into battle over and over again until only ten men remained.  The castle defenders fought heroically to the last man.  As was custom, he killed himself rather than be captured alive.

The siege of Fushimi Castle stalled the advancement of the 40,000 troops by ten days, allowing Tokugawa to escape. 

Mototada's actions changed the course of Japanese history as Tokugawa would raise an army of 90,000 and confront Pro-Toyotomi forces at Sekigahara in open battle on the Kanto plain—where he had the advantage.  In a massive bloodletting, more than 180,000 warriors would clash violently.  More than 40,000 heads would be taken in the first hours of battle and more than 70,000 would perish in the next two days as the remnants of Ishida's vanquished army were hunted down and executed.  The battle of SEKIGAHARA was a decisive one and Tokugawa’s family would rule the entire country for the next 268 years.




(Footnote:  Mototada's son's and grandsons would indeed continue in his tradition and become daimyo by Ieyasu's appointment.  Torii Tadamasa (1567 - 1628) received Iwakidaira (Mutsu, 100,000 koku) in 1603. He was moved to Yamagata (Dewa, 260,000 koku) in 1622.  Torii Tadamasa's son Torii Tadatsune (d.1636) was a daimyo,  but his fief reverted to the shogunate when Tadatsune died without an heir. Tadatsune's younger brother Torii Tadaharu (1608 - 1651, 51) continued the family name when his older brother died without an heir in 1636. He was given the Takato (Shinano, 30,000 koku)

Mototada's other son Torii Naritsugu ruled Yamura (Kai, 35,000 koku) but was dispossessed in 1632 and banished to his nephew Torii Tadatsune's domain in Yamagata)





Torii Mototada
(1539-1600 AD)

IN THE YEAR 1600, TOKUGAWA IEYASU WAS TO MOVE EAST TO CAMPAIGN IN AIZU, LEAVING THE STRATEGIC
Fushimi castle in the care of his vassal, Torii Mototada. It was more than likely that the forces of Ishida Mitsunari, a vassal of the Toyotomi clan in league with Konishi Yukinaga, would attack this castle after the Tokugawa forces left. Tokugawa expressed his fear that the castle's forces were insufficient, but Torii responded that the castle would fall even if its forces were multiplied ten times, and advocated that his lord take his troops from the castle's defense and employ them on his own campaign to the east. The sure destruction of both the castle and its defenders understood, vassal and lord spent their last evening together talking over old times.

The inevitable began on August 27 when a large force under Ishida and Konishi laid siege to the castle. Torii and his defenders resisted stubbornly, hoping to give Tokugawa more time to make gains in his march east, and indeed, the fortress was able to hold on for over ten days against enormous odds. The end finally came on September 8 when fire was set to the castle by a traitor from within. When suicide was recommended by his men, Torii upbraided them, explaining that now was the time to truly repay their master's kindness to them, and, with a force of about 300 troops, rushed out of the castle to attack the overwhelming forces of the enemy. After five such charges, their number was reduced to ten men and Torii returned to the castle and fell exhausted. A young samurai from the opposing forces approached and waited respectfully while the old man committed seppuku and then cut off his head. The defenders had been cut down to the last man.

The Last Statement was written by Torii to his son, Tadamasa, a few days before the investment of the castle. It is a moving account of unbending and selfless loyalty of vassal to master, and expresses in very clear terms that the true meaning of being a warrior is to die in battle. In language it is dignified and polite, and yet reveals the strong affection of a father for his son.


The Last Statement of Torii Mototada

Recently, there has been the report of an uprising in the Kamigata area, and that a large number of rebel daimyo who have fallen into the evil scheming of Ishida Mitsunari will first lay siege to this castle and are now making such preparations with large forces.

For myself, I am resolved to make a stand within the castle and to die a quick death. It would not take much trouble to break through a part of their
numbers and escape, no matter how many tens of thousands of horsemen approached for the attack or by how many columns we were surrounded.

But that is not the true meaning of being a warrior, and it would be difficult to account as loyalty. Rather, I will stand off the forces of the entire country here, and, without even one one-hundredth of the men necessary to do so, will throw up a defense and die a resplendent death. By doing so I will show that to abandon a castle that should be defended, or to value one's life so much as to avoid danger and to show the enemy one's weakness is not within the family traditions of my master Ieyasu.

Thus I will have taken the initiative in causing Lord Ieyasu's other retainers to be resolved, and in advancing righteousness to the warriors of the entire country. It is not the Way of the Warrior to be shamed and avoid death even under circumstances that are not particularly important. It goes without saying that to sacrifice one's life for the sake of his master is an unchanging principle. As this is a matter that I have thought over
beforehand, I think that circumstances such that I am meeting now must be envied by people of understanding.
   
You, Tadamasa, should understand the following well. Our ancestors have been personal vassals of the Matsudaira for generations. My late father, the
governor of Iga, served Lord Kiyoyasu, and later worked loyally for his son, Hirotada. My older brother, Genshichiro, manifested his absolute loyalty and was cut down in battle at Watari.

When the present Lord Ieyasu was a child and sent to Suruga, the Governor of Iga accompanied him as a guardian. later, at the age of 19, Ieyasu returned to Okazaki, and the Governor of Iga served him with unsurpassed loyalty, living more than 80 years with unswerving steadfastness. Lord Ieyasu, for his part, regarded the Governor as a matchless vassal. When I was 13 and Lord Ieyasu seven, I came before his presence for the first time, and the blessings I have received since must not be forgotten for all the generations to come.

Because Lord Ieyasu is well aware of my loyalty, he has left me here in charge of the important area of Kamigata as Deputy of Fushimi Castle while he advances toward the East, and for a warrior there is nothing that could surpass this good fortune. That I should be able to go ahead of all the other warriors of this country and lay down my life for the sake of my master's benevolence is an honor to my family and has been my most fervent desire for many years.

After I am slain, you must lovingly care for all your younger brothers, beginning with Hisagoro, in my stead. Your younger brothers must earnestly look to you as they would to their father, and must never disobey you.

As they grow up, they should one by one present themselves to the Lord Ieyasu, make efforts with their own various talents, do whatever they are
commanded, be on friendly terms with one another, and remain forever grateful to their ancestors, by whose blessings our clan was established and its descendants succored.

They must be determined to stand with Lord Ieyasu's clan in both its ascent and decline, in times of peace and in times of war; and either waking or
sleeping they must never forget that they will serve his clan, and his clan alone. To be avaricious for land or to forget old debts because of some
passing dissatisfaction, or to even temporarily entertain treacherous thoughts is not the Way of Man.

Even if all the other provinces of Japan were to unite against our lord, our descendants should not set foot inside another fief to the end of time.
Simply, in no matter what circumstances, unify with the heart of one family - of elder and younger brothers - exert yourselves in the cause of loyalty,
mutually help and be helped by one another, preserve your righteousness and strive in bravery, and be of a mind never to stain the reputation of a clan that has not remained hidden from the world, but has gained fame in military valor for generations, especially since the days of the Governor of Iga.

At any rate, if you will take it into your mind to be sincere in throwing away your life for your master, you will not have the slightest fear or trembling even with the advent of innumerable impending calamities.

    I am now 62 years of age. Of the number of times that I have barely escaped death since the time I was in Mikawa I have no idea. Yet, not once
have I acted in a cowardly way. Man's life and death, fortune and calamity are in the fate of the times, and thus one should not search out after what he likes. What is essential is to listen to the words of the older retainers, to put to use men of skill and understanding, to not commit acts of adolescent self-will, and to receive the remonstrance's of your retainers.


The entire country will soon be in the hands of your master, Lord Ieyasu. If this is so, the men who served him will no doubt hope to become daimyo by his appointment. You should know that if such feelings arise, they are inevitably the beginning of the end of one's fortunes in the Way of the Warrior.

Being affected by the avarice for office and rank, or wanting to become a daimyo and being eager for such things ... will not one then begin to value his life? And how can a man commit acts of martial valor if he values his life? A man who has been born into the house of a warrior and yet places no loyalty in his heart and thinks only of the fortune of his position will be flattering on the surface and construct schemes in his heart, will forsake righteousness and not reflect on his shame, and will stain the warrior's name of his household to later generations. This is truly regrettable. it is not necessary to say such a thing, but you should raise the name of your ancestors in this world yet a second time. Moreover, as I have already spoken to you about the management of our clan's affairs, there is no need to speak of that again. You have already seen and heard of what has been regulated from years past.

    Be first of all prudent in your conduct and have correct manners, develop harmony between master and retainers, and have compassion on those beneath you. Be correct in the degree of rewards and punishments, and let there be no partiality in your degree of intimacy with you retainers. the foundation of man's duty as a man is in "truth."  Beyond this, there is nothing to be said.




Notes:

1The area of Kyoto and Osaka.

2Early in the 13th century, Nitta Yoshisue settled in the village of Tokugawa in Kozuke and took the name of that place for his own. Late in the 14th cen­tury, his ninth-generation descendant, Yasuchika, was born in the village of Matsudaira in Mikawa, and took the name of that place for his own line. Ieyasu, Yasuchika's eighth-generation descendant, received permission from the emperor to take the name Tokugawa once again, leaving that of Matsu­daira to lateral branches of the family.

3Tokugawa's grandfather.





Edited by JKO_RONIN on 01 December 2005 at 10:51pm
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JKO_RONIN
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Posted: 30 August 2005 at 8:51pm | IP Logged Quote JKO_RONIN

Sekigahara

Sekigahara is a small village in Gifu Prefecture, yet every Japanese person knows its name. Located in a strategic pass through which ancient Nakasendo highway passes on its way to Kyoto, in 1600 on September 15th, this quiet village was the scene of the greatest battle in Japanese history.

Two years had passed since the death of Toyotomi Hideyoshi. His young son Hideyori was too young to rule, and the five regents who Toyotomi Hideyoshi had selected to protect his son, had soon divided into factions in pursuit of absolute power. The leaders of these two factions were Ishida Mitsunari, and Tokugawa Ieyasu.

The leadup to the battle of Sekigahara began in the summer. On June 16th, Tokugawa Ieyasu had to leave the Regent's Council in Osaka and move back to his base in Edo (now Tokyo), in order to protect his territories from a threat posed by Uesugi Kagekatsu (allied to the Ishida faction). Knowing that a major showdown was likely, he left a castellan in control of Osaka Castle, another garrison at Fushimi Castle under the command of Torii Mototada (who pledged to Tokugawa Ieyasu that he would defend the bastion to the last man if attacked), and moved slowly north engaging in diplomacy - shoring up alliances, mending fences, gathering intelligence - and preparing to attack the Uesugi's strongly built mountain fortress, Aizu castle.

Tokugawa Ieyasu's plan to destroy Aizu castle involved combining the armies of the Tokugawa, Satake, Date, Mogami and Maeda. The Uesugi were to be surrounded, then eliminated. On July the 8th, Sakakibara Yasumasa who was one of Tokugawa's best commanders (he had been a key figure in the battles at Nagakute against Toyotomi Hideyoshi's forces in 1584) set out for Aizu with the advance force. Nearly two weeks later, Ieyasu's son and heir Tokugawa Hidetada lead the main force of 37,000 troops north, and at the same time thousands more samurai and ashigaru (foot soldiers and musketmen) from the Date, Maeda, Mogami, and from less powerful lords, began advancing on the Uesugi's territories from the north, east and west. On the 21st, Tokugawa Ieyasu himself set out with an additional 32,000 troops.

Only an attack from the west could save Aizu from inevitable destruction. Ishida Mitsunari and several collaborators quickly denounced Ieyasu, demanded that Torii Mototada surrender his control of Fushimi Castle (which could dominate Kyoto), and began mobilizing forces for an invasion of the east. Suspecting this would happen, Tokugawa Ieyasu had advanced towards Aizu slowly - taking 5 days march to reach Oyama, a distance of 65 kilometers (approx. 40 miles) that could usually be covered in one day's ride, but that was conveniently close to the fast flowing Tone river.

The situation was extremely unstable. One by one, important daimyo (often in strategically vital territories) were siding with Ishida. The most important of all was Mori Terumoto. The ruler of the second largest feudal domain in Japan, Mori controlled lands worth more than 1 million koku from his powerbase in Hiroshima. Quickly ousting the castellan guard at Osaka Castle, troops coordinated by Mori and Ishida attacked Fushimi Castle - which they could not afford to leave in the hands of Torii Mototada's forces before launching their campaign to the east to destroy the Tokugawa. Ishida's plans were to eliminate the treat posed by Fushimi, then advance east.

Further defections to the army of the west would politically and militarily isolate Tokugawa Ieyasu completely. In the north came the disturbing news that the Satake were refusing to attack the Uesugi. Tokugawa Ieyasu had to advance west, but could not leave his territories vulnerable to an attack from the rear during his absence. His son Tokugawa Hidetada was ordered to destroy the Satake, meanwhile the attack on the Uesugi had to be indefinitely postponed. Leaving lesser lords to keep the Uesugi hemmed in their mountain base, Ieyasu had to move west. His earlier caution was to pay quick dividends. Once he had been informed by a messenger from Torii Mototada of Ishida's demands, and from his spy network of the extent of danger faced, Tokugawa Ieyasu was able to quickly return to Edo by river boat down the fast flowing Tone river.

The only daimyo quick to rally to his support were those in the Mikawa (eastern Aichi) to Suruga areas along the Pacific coast. These included men such as Ikeda Terumasa, who had fought for Toyotomi Hideyoshi against the Tokugawa in 1584 during the Komaki and Nagakute campaigns (in which his father Ikeda Nobuteru had been killed). After Tokugawa Ieyasu transferred to the Kanto region in 1590, Ikeda Terumasa established himself at Yoshida castle in eastern Mikawa (Ieyasu's home province), and in 1594 married one of Tokugawa's daughters. Tokugawa Ieyasu's earlier diplomacy and caution began paying off as one by one these daimyo threw their support to the Tokugawa. Another reason was that as their domains were former Tokugawa territories that Ieyasu knew intimately, their lands would have been hard to defend. While undertaking quick preparations in Edo castle, Ieyasu wrote letters to 108 of the 214 daimyo. Of these, 99 of the replies offered support.

The forces of Ishida and Mori overran Fushimi castle, Torii Mototada defending the castle to the last man and buying Tokugawa Ieyasu 10 very valuable days. This accomplished, the main body of the western army could now advance through Ishida's home province of Ohmi (his castle was Sawayama, near present day Hikone) to the east. The army of the west, as the coalition is often referred to, destroyed several minor castles and fortresses held by Tokugawa supporters, took complete control of Ise province and the western portions of the Tokaido highway, stormed forward from this considerable base onto the Owari plain (now the western part of Aichi Prefecture) capturing Ogaki castle, and sending more troops to the strategically important Gifu castle commanded by Oda Hidenobu, to gain his support as well as a key base astride the Nakasendo.

Once again, Tokugawa Ieyasu's caution, diplomacy and preparation paid off. Ikeda Terumasa attacked and seized Gifu castle, giving Ieyasu a strong forward position that he could supply via both the Nakasendo and Tokaido. Ikeda and the other daimyo who had rallied to the Tokugawa then pressed a further 20 kilometers (approx. 12 miles) west and established defensive field positions at Akasaka - blocking the main route of advance of the western army and immobolizing the troops who had captured Ogaki castle. This bought Tokugawa Ieyasu more time, and he arrived after a long forced march from Edo with 32,000 plus troops to a campsite prepared by Ikeda. The scene was set for the showdown, the first major question was where would it happen?

The second major question was the whereabouts of Tokugawa Hidetada, and the main force of some 38,000 troops. Hidetada had promptly destroyed the recalcitrant Satake, and then deployed to Kai. The plan had been for for Hidetada to advance along the Nakasendo while his father marched down the Tokaido, meet in Owari Province and then use their combined numbers and firepower to defeat the western army. Hidetada's force had been at Karuizawa on September 1st (the day that Ieyasu had departed Edo), however bad weather (the Nakasendo traverses a mountainous route) and a siege of Ueda Castle (Shinano Province), and to some extent poor communications delayed his advance. The siege of Ueda was a particularly bad decision. Ordered by Ieyasu to isolate the castle, Hidetada instead decided to capture it. The problem was that Ueda castle was defended by the 56 year old veteran Sanada Masayuki, a skilled general and more than a match for the 21 year old Hidetada. 4 days were lost before Hidetada abandoned his attempt to destroy the castle and resumed his march south. The end result was that during the strategy sessions taking place at Akasaka, Ieyasu had to come to terms with the fact that just over half of his main army was still some 200 kilometers (approx. 125 miles) away, and there was no certainty as to the timing of its arrival.

In Akasaka, the debate was whether to engage Ogaki castle, or surround it and then bypass it in order to attack Ishida's home province on the other side of the Sekigahara pass. Ii Naomasa, a trusted retainer who had joined Ieyasu before the battle of Nagashino some 25 years earlier, advocated attacked Ogaki. Ieyasu, mindful that he was without Hidetada's troops and that a successful attack on Sawayama castle would not only destroy Ishida's powerbase, but would also leave the road to Kyoto and Osaka open, decided to leave sufficient troops at Ogaki to contain the units there, and move forward. Morale in the eastern camp was high.

The situation was completely different in the western camp. Leadership was an issue, with a lack of trust between the various commanders a key contributor. Communications and preparations were less than adequate, formations slower to deploy. The true cost of the 10 day siege of Fushimi castle was beginning to hurt. Other sieges hurt even more - 15,000 men besieged the castle of Hosokawa Yusai at Tanabe in Tango province on the Sea of Japan coast, and these troops never reached the battlefield of Sekigahara. The castle was defended by a garrison of just 500 men. Another castle, this time the strategically vital Otsu castle at the southern end of Lake Biwa defended by 3000 troops under Kyogoku Takatsugu, kept another 15,000 troops away from the battlefield. Mori Terumoto, who was Mitsunari's most important ally, was deliberatingly keeping some 30,000 of his troops in Osaka. Rumours of betrayal and shifting loyalties abounded.

Most frustrating of all was poor intelligence and an inability to track the maneuvers and deployments of the Tokugawa. The number of daimyo supporting Ieyasu was a frustration and surprise for Ishida Mitsunari, as was the speed with which Ieyasu had managed to move large numbers of men from Kanto to Owari, capturing Gifu as well. According to the plans, Tokugawa Ieyasu was supposed to be north of Edo fighting the Uesugi. Yet Mitsunari's forward units were reporting that instead Ieyasu was armed to the teeth and directly opposite their lines. Even more disturbing was Ieyasu's strategic positioning, Mitsunari immediately realized that unless he moved immediately, he could soon be cut off from Sawayama and Kyoto and surrounded.

To evade the trap, the army of the west decided to move at once to the narrow pass of Sekigahara, leaving a garrison of 7,500 men at Ogaki, and block the route west. Heavy rain began to fall, and forward units of the Tokugawa army were able to harass the rearguard units as they made their way through the night to Sekigahara. Despite the foul weather and heavy rain, trees were felled to build palisades to protect the musketmen from cavalry, and earthworks constructed. There was little opportunity to sleep or cook, and when morning came the plain was covered in dense fog limiting visibility. The prime objective of most of the men was to get some fires going to help dry out - particularly those who had been unable to keep gunpowder protected from the weather.

Ishida Mitsunari placed his headquarters on the northern flank of the western army, on a spur of Mount Sasao that commanded the Nakasendo and offered a good view of the entire battlefield. On the south flank, also in a strong position were the 15,600 troops of Kobayakawa Hideaki on Mount Matsuo, and in the center, also in a strong position due to high ground at the base of Mount Tengu, The 17,000 men commanded by Ukita Hideie and other units. In short, the army of the west had a strong defensive position. The position was even stronger, because nearly 28,000 more troops were on Mount Nangu, as it placed them in a perfect position to encircle Tokugawa Ieyasu's reserve units and trap the eastern forces.

There had been numerous skirmished during the deployments of the night, but the battle didn't begin in earnest until the fog lifted around 8am, when Ii Naomasa's troops charged Ukita Hideie's position in the center of the western line. As the matchlock arquebusiers (a type of firearm introduced to Japan by the Portuguese from the middle of the 16th century) of the troops commanded by Fukushima Masanori (Owari province) tore into the Ukita battalions, other units began to attack the western army across the line, including Ishida's position. A fierce battle of attrition began with appalling casualties in the muddy fields of the plain. The army of the west had a numerical superiority, and the absence of Tokugawa Hidetada with the bulk of the Tokugawa army was crucial. It looked like the army of the west was going to win the day.

At this stage of the battle, Ishida lit a pre-arranged signal fire to order Kobayakawa Hideaki (15,600 men) on the right flank, and the units on Mount Nangu behind Tokugawa Ieyasu into action. To Ishida's immense dismay, the units did not move. Runners were sent, but to no avail. Ishida did not know, that in the lead up to the battle Kobayakawa had been offered lands by Tokugawa Ieyasu in exchange for secretly agreeing to switch sides during the decisive battle. When Kobayakawa finally did command his troops to attack (prompted by volleys of musket fire from Tokugawa's troops to "remind" him of his secret undertaking), his forces crashed through the lines of the Otani and Ukita troops, not those of Tokugawa Ieyasu.

The entire center of the army of west began to disintegrate. Ishida himself fled the battlefield (along with many of his men) to nearby Mount Ibuki where he was captured 3 days later, taken to Kyoto and beheaded. Months of preparation and manuvering led to a decisive encounter that was all over in about 6 hours. Casualties were appalling, particularly for the west.

Towards the end the battle, Ii Naomasa was wounded by a musket shot during savage fighting with the Shimazu forces, who had continued to hold their lines. The Shimazu realized that they faced immiment defeat, and that the withdrawal route was now blocked by flanking forces. In an reckless and audacious move, they decide to withdraw from the battlefield - not to the rear but by instead advancing straight through the center of the Tokugawa lines. It says something of the sheer chaos of the situation that this was successful - albeit with further carnage inflicted by the Ii - riding straight past Ieyasu's headquarters. Only a handful of Shimazu's men, some 80 in total, reached Kyushu safely. His nephew was one of those who didn't make it, loosing his head (literally) after swapping helmets with his uncle to assist with the escape. Such sacrifices were common at Sekigahara.

Satsuma, a feudal domain located in the southern part of Kyushu with a castle town at Kagoshima, continued to be ruled during the Edo period by the Shimazu family. Satsuma was also one of the four domains which overthrew the Tokugawa shogunate in the Meiji Restoration that restored the Emperor to authority in 1868. Men from Satsuma and Choshu dominated government in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries. During the Edo period, Satsuma was prevented from having a national role because the domain fought against the Tokugawa at the battle of Sekigahara in 1600. The resentment felt by the Satsuma was one of the reasons for the Meiji Restoration. The scars of Sekigahara never really healed.

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